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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to define a new notion of local equilib-
rium in an exchange economy, where the consumers face lower bounds
on net trades. Then, we show that the local equilibrium is unique if
the lower bounds are closed enough to 0. By the way, we also pro-
vides a convergence result of local equilibrium price toward Walras
equilibrium price of a suitable linear economy.
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1 Introduction
In an exchange economy, under suitable assumptions on the differentiability
of the utility functions, it is well known that equilibrium is generically locally
unique (See, for example, [5, 6, 8, 1]). This local uniqueness means that there
exists only one equilibrium in a sufficiently small neighborhood around an
equilibrium price.
In this paper, we focus our attention to another approach with a new
concept of local equilibrium. Actually, we assume that the consumers do
not consider all possible consumptions but only those which are close to the
initial endowments. So the net trades on the market remain small. Formally,
this means that the consumption set of a consumer is the set of consump-
tions which are above a given fraction of the initial endowments. We can
also interpret this as the fact that the consumers face a restricted market
participation where the trades must lie in bounded below subsets depending
on endowments with a lower bound close to 0. Then, a local equilibrium is
a Walras equilibrium of this economy with restricted consumption sets.
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We first study the link between local equilibria and equilibria of a family
of linear economies as the tangent linear economies introduced in [4, 3]. The
linear economies are defined by the constant marginal utilities of the agents,
which are computed using the marginal utilities at the initial endowments.
Since the trades in a local economy converge to 0 when the trades are more
and more restricted, we have to rescale them in order to be comparable with
the ones of the linear economies. Actually, we show that we can associate to
a local economy an auxiliary economy with the same initial endowments, the
positive orthant for the consumption sets and new utility functions derived
from the original one by a rescaling of the net trade. Then, we show that
the equilibria of these auxiliary economies converge to an equilibrium of a
linear economy when the scaling factors tend to 0. The limit linear economy
depends on the limit of the direction of the lower bounds on the net trades.
In particular, this implies that a local equilibrium price is close to the unique
equilibrium price of the limit linear economy and the rescaled equilibrium
allocations are also close to the equilibrium allocations of the tangent linear
economy.
The main contribution of the paper is to show that the local equilibrium
price is unique for sufficiently restricted trade when the utility functions
are strictly quasi-concave. Obviously, we also have the uniqueness of the
equilibrium allocation. The proof is based on a concave representation of
preferences and a convexity-like property of the indirect utility functions.
This result can be related to the fact that the Walras equilibrium price
is unique when the initial endowments are in a neighborhood of the contract
curve or of the set of Pareto optimal allocations (See [1]). In that case,
without any a priori restrictions, the trades are small. So we remain in the
same kind of interpretation: the equilibrium is unique when the trades are
small, that is when the gains in terms of utility level are closed to the first
order linear approximation.
This result also provides a new result about uniqueness of Walras equi-
libria when the second derivatives of utility functions are close to 0. This
generalizes the result of uniqueness for linear exchange economy, where the
second derivatives of utility functions are equal to 0.
Consequently, we have two approaches of the local uniqueness of equilib-
ria. Either, as in the literature, we consider a neighborhood of the price and
we require that the equilibrium price is unique in this neighborhood or we
consider restricted trades, that is equilibrium allocations in a neighborhood
of the initial endowments and we have a unique equilibrium price.
This paper is a first step toward the definition of a discrete Walrasian
exchange process where the exchanges are determined at each period by the
unique net trades associated to the unique local equilibrium.
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2 Local equilibrium
We consider a family of pure exchange economies with ` commodities and m
consumers1. The preferences of the agents are represented by utility functions
ui from R`+ to R. The initial endowments are taken in a nonempty compact
subset E of (R`++)m. So, for an element e = (ei)mi=1 ∈ E, the economy E(e)
is defined by (R`+, ui, ei)mi=1. For τ = (τi)mi=1 ∈ ([0; 1]`)m, we define a τ -local
equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2.1 (p∗, (x∗i )) ∈ R`+× (R`+)m is a τ -local equilibrium of the econ-
omy E(e) if
(i) for all i = 1, . . . ,m, x∗i is a solution of

maximize ui(xi)
p∗ · xi ≤ p∗ · ei
xi ≥ (1− τi)¤ei
(ii)
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i =
∑m
i=1 ei.
The difference with a standard Walras equilibrium comes from the con-
straint xi ≥ (1 − τi)¤ei instead of xi ≥ 0. This constraint means that
the consumption set of the consumer is {(1 − τi)¤ei} + R`+ instead of R`+,
so a τ -local equilibrium is a Walras equilibrium of the τ -local economy
Eτ (e) = ({(1 − τi)¤ei} + R`+, ui, ei)mi=1. One remarks that a τ -local equi-
librium is merely a Walras equilibrium of the economy E(e) when τi = 1 for
all i. A τ - local equilibrium is (p∗, (ei)), where p∗ is any non-zero price vector
in R`+ when τi = 0 for all i.
This constraint xi ≥ (1− τi)¤ei is equivalent to the constraint on the net
trade zi = xi − ei ≥ −τi¤ei. So a local equilibrium is an equilibrium with
restricted trades, where the maximization problem of a consumer is:
maximize ui(ei + zi)
p∗ · zi ≤ 0
zi ≥ −τi¤ei
When for all i and for all h τhi is small , the equilibrium allocation of a
τ -local equilibrium is close to e. Indeed, if we combine the lower constraint
xi ≥ (1−τi)¤ei with the market clearing condition (ii), one gets (1−τi)¤ei ≤
x∗i ≤ ei +
∑
j 6=i τj¤ej, so τi¤ei ≤ x∗i − ei ≤
∑
j 6=i τj¤ej.
We now introduce a family of auxiliary economies (Eˆτ (e))(τ,e)∈ (]0,1[`)m×E
and we show the link between a τ -local equilibrium of E(e) and a Walras
equilibrium of the auxiliary economy Eˆτ (e). The difference between Eτ (e)
and Eˆτ (e) is that we modify the preferences instead of the consumption sets.
1In R`, S denotes the simplex and ‖x‖ =∑`h=1 |xh| for all x ∈ R`. The box product is
defined as follows: for a pair of vectors (x, y) of R`, x¤y is the vector of R` with components
xhyh for h = 1, . . . , `. We denote by 1 the vector of R` the components of which are all
equal to 1.
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Definition 2.2 For all τ ∈ (]0, 1[`)m and e ∈ E, the pure exchange economy
Eˆτ (e) is the economy where the consumption sets are equal to R`+, the initial
endowments are e = (ei)
m
i=1 and the preferences are represented by the utility
function uτiiei defined by:
uτiiei(xi) =
ui ((1− τi)¤ei + τi¤xi))− ui(ei)
‖τi‖
Note that the coefficient 1/‖τi‖ and the additional term −ui(ei) are use-
less in the definition since the preferences are the same with or without them.
Nevertheless we use this formulation to emphasize later the convergence to-
wards the tangent linear economy.
We can interpret the preferences of the agent as follows. For two con-
sumptions xi and x
′
i, far from ei, the consumer compares them by considering
the two allocations ei + τi¤(xi − ei) and ei + τi¤(x′i − ei) which are close to
the current allocation ei. So, it is as if the consumer has well known prefer-
ences around her initial endowments and extrapolates them for the farther
allocations. This can be understood as a limited rationality of the agent or
a risk aversion for large trades. Once again, if τi = 1 for all i, then Eˆτ (e) is
merely the initial economy E(e).
Remark 2.1 We can remark that the definition of Eˆτ (e) is independent of
the choice of the representations of preferences. That is, if u˜i represents the
same preferences as ui then u˜
τi
iei
represents the same preferences as uτiiei since
we have:
uτii (xi) ≥ uτii (x′i) ⇔ ui(ei + τi¤(xi − ei)) ≥ ui(ei + τi¤(x′ − ei))
⇔ u˜i(ei + τi¤(xi − ei)) ≥ u˜i(ei + τi¤(x′ − ei))
⇔ u˜τiiei(xi) ≥ u˜τiiei(x′i).
So, the economies with the utility functions uτiiei or with the utility func-
tions u˜τiiei are identical.
The next proposition gives the link between τ -local equilibrium of E(e)
and Walras equilibrium of Eˆτ (e) for each τ ∈ (]0, 1[`)m and e ∈ E.
Proposition 2.1 Let e ∈ E and τ ∈ (]0, 1[`)m. If (p∗, (x∗i )) is a τ -local
equilibrium of E(e), then (p∗, ((τi)−1¤(x∗i − ei))i) is an equilibrium of the
economy Eˆτ (e). Conversely, if (p∗, (ξ∗i )) is an equilibrium of Eˆτ (e), then
(p∗, (ei + τi¤(ξ∗i − ei)i) is a τ -local equilibrium of the economy E(e).
The proof is obvious starting from the definitions of a Walras equilibrium
and τ -local equilibrium.
We now end this section by considering the tangent linear economy Eˆρ0 (e)
associated to E(e) and to a parameter ρ ∈ Sm. This follows the approach of
[4].
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Definition 2.3 If the utility functions are differentiable at the initial endow-
ments e = (ei), the linear economy Eˆρ0 (e) is the economy with the consump-
tion sets R`+, the initial endowments ei and the linear preferences represented
by the utility function uˆρiiei defined by:
uˆρiiei(xi) = [ρi¤∇ui(ei)] · (xi − ei)
Once again, we remark that the preferences are represented by the simpler
utility function [ρi¤∇ui(ei)] ·xi but we choose such formulation to get simpler
statements later.
3 Convergence of τ-local equilibria
From now on, we consider τ ∈ (]0, 1
2
]`)m. The upper bound 1
2
is arbitrary
chosen in ]0, 1[ to guarantee the compactness of the sets we are considering
in the proofs. Recall that E is a compact of (R`++)m.
We posit the following standard assumption on the preferences in the
theory of general economic equilibrium from a differentiable approach.
Assumption C. For all i, ui is twice continuously differentiable on R`++
and ∇ui(xi) ∈ R`++ for all xi ∈ R`++.
The following propositions show that the distance between the economies
Eˆτ (e) and Eˆρ0 (e) converges to zero when τ converges uniformly to zero.
Proposition 3.1 Let K be a compact subset of (R`+)m. Under Assumption
C, for all ε > 0, there exists θ¯ > 0 such that for all τ ∈ ([0, 1/2]`)m, for all
(e, x) ∈ E×K and for all i, if 0 < ‖τi‖ ≤ θ¯, then
|uτiiei(xi)− uˆρiiei(xi)| ≤ ε
where ρi =
1
‖τi‖τi.
The proof of this proposition given in Appendix is a direct consequence
of Taylor formula. We deduce from this uniform convergence on compacta a
result of continuity (see the proof in Appendix).
Corollary 3.1 Under Assumption C, for all i, the function U from
U : [0,
1
2
]m × Sm × E× (R`+)m → Rm
defined by
Ui(θ, ρ, e, x) =
{
uθiρiiei (xi) if θi 6= 0
uˆρiiei(xi) if θi = 0
is continuous.
5
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2008.102 (Version révisée)
We now deduce the convergence of equilibrium prices and equilibrium
allocations.
In the following, we normalize the prices in the simplex S of R`. For
τ ∈ (]0, 1
2
]`
)m
, we denote by P τ the normalized price equilibrium correspon-
dence associated to Eˆτ . For ρ ∈ Sm, we denote by P ρ0 the normalized price
equilibrium correspondence associated to the linear economy Eˆρ0 . We know
from [4, 7] that (ρ, e)→ P ρ0 (e) is actually a single valued continuous mapping
on (S ∩R`++)m × (R`++)m. Let Γ ⊂ R`++ ∪ {0} be a nonempty closed convex
cone and Σ = Γ ∩ S.
Proposition 3.2 Under Assumption C, for all ε > 0 there exists θˆ > 0 such
that for all τ ∈ (Γ∩]0, θˆ]`)m and for all e ∈ E,
P τ (e) ⊂ B¯(P ρ0 (e), ε)
where B¯(P ρ0 (e), ε) denotes the closed ball of center P
ρ
0 (e) and radius ε and
ρ =
(
1
‖τi‖τi
)m
i=1
.
Remark 3.1 Note that the above proposition together with the continuity of
the mapping P ρ0 implies that for all sequences (τ
ν , eν , pν) ∈ (Γ∩]0, 1/2]`)m ×
E× S converging to (0, e, p) and satisfying pν ∈ P τν (eν) for all integer ν, if
ρν =
(
1
‖τνi ‖τ
ν
i
)m
i=1
converges to ρ, then p ∈ P ρ0 (e).
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exists ε > 0 such that for all
integer ν ≥ 1, there exists τ ν ∈ (Γ∩]0, 1/ν]`)m and eν ∈ E such that
P τ
ν
(eν) * B¯(P ρ
ν
0 (e
ν), ε) where ρν =
(
1
‖τνi ‖τ
ν
i
)m
i=1
. Note that ρν belongs
to Σm. Then, for all integer ν, there exists x¯ν ∈ (R`+)m and p¯ν ∈ P τν (eν)
such that (pν , x¯ν) is an equilibrium of Eˆτν (eν) and pν /∈ B¯(P ρν0 (eν), ε).
The sequence (x¯ν) is bounded since E is compact and x¯νi ≤
∑m
i=1 e
ν
i for
all ν. Since Σ, E and S are compact subsets, there exists a subsequence
of (τ ν , ρν , eν , p¯ν , x¯ν) (denoted identically for the sake of simpler notations)
which converges. Let us denote (0, ρ, e, p¯, x¯) its limit. From the fact that
(p¯ν , x¯ν) is an equilibrium of Eˆτν (eν), one deduces that ∑mi=1 x¯i = ∑mi=1 ei
and p¯ · x¯i ≤ p¯ · ei for all i. Furthermore, p¯ /∈ B(P ρ0 (e), ε). Hence p¯ is not
an equilibrium price vector of Eˆρ0 (e), so there exists i such that x¯i does not
belong to the demand for uˆρiiei at (p¯, p¯ · ei).
Consequently there exists a vector ξi ∈ R`+ such that p¯ · ξi ≤ p¯ · ei and
uˆρiiei(ξi) > uˆ
ρi
iei
(x¯i). Since according to Assumption C, ∇ui(ei) À 0 and
p¯ · ei > 0, we can choose ξi in such a way that p¯ · ξi < p¯ · ei.
For ν large enough, pν · ξi < pν · eνi . Since (p¯ν , x¯ν) is an equilibrium of
Eˆτν (eν), one deduces that uτνiieνi (ξi) < u
τνi
ieνi
(x¯νi ). From Corollary 3.1, since τ
ν
i =
‖τ νi ‖ρνi , one deduces that limν→∞ u‖τ
ν
i ‖ρνi
iei
(ξi) = uˆ
ρi
iei
(ξi) ≤ limν→∞ u‖τ
ν
i ‖ρνi
iei
(x¯νi ) =
uˆρiiei(x¯i), which is in contradiction with uˆ
ρi
iei
(ξi) > uˆ
ρi
iei
(x¯i). ¤
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We now state a result on the convergence of equilibrium allocations. Since
there is no uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation for the linear tangent
economy, we do not really have a convergence property but a closed graph
property.
Proposition 3.3 Let (τ ν , eν , xν) be a sequence of (Γ∩]0, 1
2
]`)m×E× (R`+)m
converging to (0, e, x¯). Under Assumption C, if xν is an equilibrium allocation
of the economy Eˆτν (eν) for all ν and ρν =
(
1
‖τνi ‖τ
ν
i
)m
i=1
converges to ρ, then
x¯ is an equilibrium allocation of the tangent linear economy Eˆρ(e).
Proof. Let (τ ν , eν , xν) be a sequence of (Γ∩]0, 1
2
]`)m×E× (R`+)m converging
to (0, e, x¯). For all ν, let us assume that xν is an equilibrium allocation of
the economy Eˆτν (eν). Let us assume that ρν =
(
1
‖τνi ‖τ
ν
i
)m
i=1
converges to ρ.
Let (pν) be the sequence of normalized equilibrium price associated to (xν)
and p¯ = P ρ0 (e). From Proposition 3.2, (p
ν) converges to p¯. Consequently,
one easily checks that p¯ · x¯i = p¯ · ei and
∑m
i=1 x¯i =
∑m
i=1 ei.
Since ei À 0 and p¯ ∈ S, p¯ · ei > 0. Let ξi ∈ R`+ such that p¯ · ξi < p¯ · ei.
For ν large enough, pν · ξi ≤ pν · eνi . Hence, since (pν , xν) is an equilibrium of
Eˆτν (eν), one has uτνiieνi (ξi) ≤ u
τνi
ieνi
(xνi ). From Corollary 3.1, one gets at the limit
uˆρiei(ξi) ≤ uˆρiei(x¯i). Now, let ξi ∈ R`+ such that p¯ · ξi ≤ p¯ ·ei. Since p¯ ·ei > 0, ξi
is the limit of a sequence of consumptions ξµi such that p¯·ξµi < p¯·ei. From the
continuity of the utility function uˆρiei , one concludes that uˆ
ρ
iei
(ξi) ≤ uˆρiei(x¯i).
So x¯i is optimal in the budget set associated to p¯ and p¯ · ei. Hence (x¯i) is an
equilibrium allocation of the economy Eˆρ0 (e). ¤
4 Uniqueness of the local equilibrium
The main result of the paper is the following one about the uniform unique-
ness of the τ -local equilibrium for initial endowments remaining in a compact
subset of (R`++)m if the vector τ is uniformly small enough. For this, we need
the utility functions to satisfy, in addition to C, the following standard as-
sumption.
Assumption C ′. For all i, for all xi ∈ R`++ and for all zi ∈ R` \ {0}, one
has :
[∇ui(xi) · zi = 0]⇒ [zi ·D2ui(xi)(zi) < 0].
Proposition 4.1 Under Assumptions C and C ′, there exists θ˜ > 0 such
that, for all τ ∈ (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m and for all e ∈ E the economy Eˆτ (e) has a
unique normalized equilibrium. Hence, for all τ ∈ (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m and for all
e ∈ E, the economy E(e) has a unique normalized τ -local equilibrium.
The proof is based on a combination of the concavity of the utility function
and a convexity-like property of the indirect utility functions associated to
7
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uτiei when the vector τ is small enough. This property is known to be satisfied
when the utility function is linear (See, [2]).
In order to prepare this proof, we first recall that we can consider concave
utility functions without any loss of generality. Let
A(E) = {(xi) ∈ (R`+)m | ∃e ∈ E,
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
ei}
Since E is compact, A(E) is a compact subset of (R`+)m. Let K be the
image of ([0, (1/2)]`)m × E × A(E) by the continuous mapping (τ, e, (xi))
to ((1− τi)¤ei + τi¤xi)mi=1. Since ([0, (1/2)]`)m × E×A(E) is compact, K is
compact. We remark thatK ⊂ (R`++)m. Finally, for all i, Kˆi is the projection
of K on the i-th component of (R`)m, that is
Kˆi = {xi ∈ R`++ | ∃x−i ∈ (R`++)m−1, (xi, x−i) ∈ K}
We now apply the following lemma (See, [8] Proposition 2.6.4 p.80).
Lemma 4.1 Under Assumptions C and C ′, there exists a C2 utility function
u˜i on R`++, which represents the same preferences as ui and which is strictly
concave on a convex open neighborhood of Kˆi.
Remark. Thanks to Lemma 4.1, without any loss of generality, we assume
that the utility function ui are concave on a convex open neighborhood of
Kˆi in the remainder of the paper.
We are now working on the indirect utility function. For all τi ∈ (]0, 12 ])`,
the indirect utility function vτiiei associated to u
τi
iei
is defined by:
vτiiei(p, w) = max{uτiiei(xi) | p · xi ≤ w, xi ≥ 0}
Here, we introduce two functions.The first one is denoted by ψ and defined
from R` to R`++ by:
ψ(q) = (exp(q1), exp(q2), . . . , exp(q`)).
The second one is denoted by V τiiei and defined from R
` to R by:
V τiiei(q) = v
τi
iei
(ψ(q), ψ(q) · ei).
Before stating the key lemma on the convexity of V τiiei , we first define
a compact subset of potential equilibrium prices. As already noticed, the
function (ρ, e) → P ρ0 (e) is a continuous mapping on (S ∩ R`++)m × E. So
the image P0 of Σm × E by P0 is a compact subset of R`++. Let ε > 0 small
enough, such that B¯(P0, ε) ⊂ R`++. Then, from Proposition 3.2, there exists
θˆ > 0 such that for all (τ, e) ∈ (Γ∩]0, θˆ]`)m × E, P τ (e) ⊂ B¯(P0, ε). Let
Q = {(ln(p1/p`), . . . , ln(p`−1/p`), 0) | p ∈ B¯(P0, ε)}
Q is a compact subset of R`. The proof of the following key lemma is given
in Appendix.
8
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Lemma 4.2 Under Assumption C and C ′, there exists θ ∈]0, 1
2
] such that
for all (τ, e) ∈ (Γ∩]0, θ]`)m × E, for all i, the function V τiiei is strictly convex
on the convex hull of Q.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Let θ˜ = min{θˆ, θ} where θ is given by Lemma 4.2 and θˆ by Proposition 3.2.
Let us assume by contraposition that there exists (τ, e) ∈ (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m × E
such that the economy Eˆτ (e) has two different normalized equilibrium prices
p and p′. Let (xi) (resp. (yi)) be the equilibrium allocation associated to p
(resp. p′). Let r be the price vector defined by rh =
√
php′h for h = 1, . . . , `.
Let q and q′ be the vectors defined as follows:
q = (ln(p1/p`), . . . , ln(p`−1/p`), 0)
q′ =
(
ln(p′1/p
′
`), . . . , ln(p
′
`−1/p
′
`), 0
)
Since e ∈ E, τ ∈ (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m ⊂ (Γ∩]0, θˆ]`)m, q and q′ belongs to Q. So we
deduce from Lemma 4.2 that for all i,
V τiiei
(
1
2
q +
1
2
q′
)
<
1
2
V τiiei(q) +
1
2
V τiiei(q
′).
In addition, one remarks that for all h, ln(rh/r`) =
1
2
qh+
1
2
q′h, V
τi
iei
(q) = vτiiei(p)
and V τiiei(q
′) = vτiiei(p
′). Finally we get
1
2
vτiiei(p) +
1
2
vτiiei(p
′) > vτiiei(r) for all i.
So, since (xi) (resp. (yi)) is the equilibrium allocation associated to p (resp.
p′), we get, for all i,
1
2
u˜τiei(xi) +
1
2
u˜τiei(yi) > v
τ
iei
(r).
From the definition of A(E) and K, ei+τi¤(xi−ei) and ei+τi¤(yi−ei) belong
to Kˆi. Since u˜
τi
iei
(ξi) = (1/‖τ‖) (u˜i(ei + τi¤(ξi − ei))− u˜i(ei)) and (1/2)(ei +
τi¤(xi− ei)) + (1/2)(ei+ τi¤(yi− ei)) = ei+ τi¤(((1/2)xi+ (1/2)yi)− ei), the
concavity of ui implies that:
u˜τiiei
(
1
2
xi +
1
2
yi
)
≥ 1
2
u˜τiiei (xi) +
1
2
u˜τiiei (yi) > v
τi
i (r) ∀i.
From the definition of the indirect utility function, this implies r·(1
2
xi+
1
2
yi) >
r · ei for all i. We get a contradiction since
m∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
i=1
yi =
m∑
i=1
ei.
The utility function ui being strictly quasi-concave on R`++ by Assumption
C’, the utility function uτiiei is strictly quasi-concave on R
`
+ for all τi ∈]0; 1[`. So
the demand is single valued and the uniqueness of the normalized equilibrium
price implies the uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation. ¤
9
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For all (e, τ) ∈ E × (Γ∩]0, (1/2)]`)m, we denote by X(e, τ) the set of
normalized τ -local equilibrium of the economy E(e). The previous result
shows that X is a mapping on E× (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m.
Corollary 4.1 Under assumption C and C ′, the normalized τ -local equilib-
rium mapping X is continuous on E× (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m.
Proof. Since the range of X is included in S ×A(E), which is bounded, it
suffices to show that for all sequence (eν , τ ν) in E× (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m converging
to (e, τ) ∈ E× (Γ∩]0, θ˜]`)m such that the sequence (X (eν , τ ν)) converges to
(p, (xi)), then X (e, τ) = (p, (xi)).
For all ν, letX (eν , τ ν) = (pν , (xνi )). Since x
ν
i ≥ (1−τ ν)¤eνi , pν ·xiν ≤ pν ·eνi
for all i, and
∑m
i=1 x
ν
i =
∑m
i=1 e
ν
i for all ν, we get xi ≥ (1− τ)¤ei, p ·xi ≤ p · ei
for all i, and
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑m
i=1 ei.
Since p ∈ S and ei À 0, p · ei > 0, hence p · ei > p · (1 − τ)¤ei. Notice
also that (1− τ)¤ei ¿ ei. Let xi such that xi À (1− τ)¤ei and p · xi < p · ei.
For ν large enough, xi ≥ (1− τ ν)¤eνi , pν · xi ≤ pν · eνi , hence, since (pν , (xνi ))
is a τ -local equilibrium of E(eν), ui(xi) ≤ ui(xνi ). At the limit, one gets
ui(xi) ≤ ui(xi). Now, let ξi such that p · ξi ≤ p · ei and (1 − τ)¤ei ≤ ξi.
Since p · ei > 0 and (1− τ)¤ei ¿ ei, there exists a sequence (ξµi ) converging
to ξi and satisfying ξ
µ
i À (1 − τ)¤ei and p · ξµi < p · ei for all µ. From the
argument above, ui(ξ
µ
i ) ≤ ui(xi). So, from the continuity of ui, at the limit,
ui(ξi) ≤ ui(xi), which means that xi is the demand of agent i for the price p.
¤
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The Taylor formula applied to ui at ei gives:
ui(ei + τi¤(xi − ei))− ui(ei) =∇ui(ei) · τi¤(xi − ei)+
1
2
D2ui(ξi)[τi¤(xi − ei), τi¤(xi − ei)]
Where ξi ∈ [ei, ei + τi¤xi]. Hence:
uτiiei(xi) =∇ui(ei) · (
1
‖τi‖τi¤(xi − ei))+
1
2‖τi‖D
2ui(ξi)[τi¤(xi − ei), τi¤(xi − ei)].
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Then we have:
|uτiiei(xi)− uˆρiiei(xi)| =
∥∥∥∥ 12‖τi‖D2ui(ξi)[τi¤(xi − ei), τi¤(xi − ei)]
∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
2‖τi‖‖D
2ui(ξi)‖‖τi¤(xi − ei)‖2
≤ 1
2
‖τi‖‖D2ui(ξi)‖‖xi − ei‖2
The last inequality comes from the fact that:
‖τi¤(xi − ei)‖ =
∑`
h=1 |τhi ||xhi − ehi | ≤
√√√√∑`
h=1
|τhi |2
√√√√∑`
h=1
|xhi − ehi |2
≤ ‖τi‖‖xi − ei‖
The subset
K′ = {(ei + τi¤(xi − ei))mi=1 | (e, τ, x) ∈ E× [0, 1/2]` ×K}
is a compact subset of R`++. So M ′ and M ′′ defined by:
M ′ = max
i
sup
ξ∈K′
‖D2ui(ξi)‖, M ′′ = max
i
sup
(e,x)∈E×K
‖xi − ei‖2
are finite since ui is twice continuously differentiable on R`++ for all i. We
yield the result by taking θ¯ ≤ 2ε
`M ′M ′′ . ¤
Proof of corollary 3.1
Since ui is continuous, Ui is continuous on [0,
1
2
]m×Sm×E× (R`+)m if θi 6= 0.
We just have to check the continuity of Ui when θi = 0. Let (θ¯, ρ¯, e¯, x¯)
such that θ¯i = 0. LetK be a compact neighborhood of x¯ in (R`+)m. Let ε > 0.
Since the mapping (ρ, e, x)→ uˆρiiei(xi) is continuous on Sm×E×(R`+)m, there
exists an open neighborhood A of (ρ¯, e¯, x¯) such that for all (ρ, e, x) ∈ A,
|uˆρiiei(xi)− uˆρ¯iie¯i(x¯i)| ≤ ε/2.
From Proposition 3.1, there exists θ¯ > 0 such that:
for all (τ, e, x) ∈ ([0, 1/2]`)m × e×K, if 0 < ‖τi‖ ≤ θ¯, then
|uτiiei(xi)− uˆρiiei(xi)| ≤ ε/2
with ρi = (1/‖τi‖)τi.
Let B be the subset of [0, 1/2]m × [A ∩ (Sm × E×K)] such that θi ≤ θ¯.
B is a neighborhood of (θ¯, ρ¯, e¯, x¯) in [0, 1
2
]m × Sm × E× (R`+)m since K is a
11
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neighborhood of x¯ and A a neighborhood of (ρ¯, e¯, x¯). Let (θ, ρ, e, x) ∈ B. If
θi = 0,
|Ui(θ, ρ, e, x)− Ui(θ¯, ρ¯, e¯, x¯)| = |uˆρiiei(xi)− uˆρ¯iie¯i(x¯i)| ≤ ε/2
since (ρ, e, x) ∈ A.
If θi > 0,
|Ui(θ, ρ, e, x)− Ui(θ¯, ρ¯, e¯, x¯)| ≤ |uθiρiiei (xi)− uˆρiiei(xi)|+ |uˆρiiei(xi)− uˆρ¯iie¯i(x¯i)|
≤ ε
since (ρ, e, x) ∈ A and 0 < ‖θiρi‖ = θi ≤ θ¯. ¤
Proof of Lemma 4.2
For all p ∈ R`++ and w ≥ 0, one has:
vτiiei(p, w) = maxα∈S
uτiiei
((
αhw
ph
)`
h=1
)
.
and there exists α ∈ S such that
vτiiei(p, w) = u
τi
iei
((
αhw
ph
)`
h=1
)
.
Consequently for all q ∈ R`, V τiiei(q) = maxα∈S V
τi
ieiα
(q), where
V τiieiα(q) = u
τi
iei
(αh∑`
k=1
eik exp(qk − qh)
)`
h=1
 .
It suffices to show that for all i, there exists θi > 0 such that for all
τi ∈ (Γ∩]0; θi]`), for all e ∈ E and for all α ∈ S, V τieiα is strictly convex on the
convex hull of Q, coQ. One then gets the result by taking the minimum of
θi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
For all i, Eˆi denotes the projection of E on the i-th component of (R`)m.
It is a compact subset included in R`++.
For the sake of simpler notation, we omit the subscript i in the remaining
of the proof. Let us compute the Hessian matrix of V τeα. For all χ ∈ R`,
χ ·D2V τeα(q)(χ) is equal to2
∑`
h=1
αhu
τ ′
eh(ξ)
(∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)2
)
+
∑`
h,k=1
αhαku
τ ′′
ekh(ξ)ζhζk (1)
2See below for the details of computations.
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where
ξ =
(
αh
∑`
k=1
ek exp(qk − qh)
)`
h=1
, ζ =
(∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)
)`
h=1
,
uτ ′eh is the first order partial derivative of u
τ
e with respect to the hth component
and uτ ′′ekh is the first order partial derivative of u
τ ′
eh with respect to the kth
component.
From the definition of uτe , one remarks that the Hessian matrix of u
τ
e at ξ
is equal to
(
τhτ ku′′hk(e+ τ¤(ξ − e))
)
hk
. Note that for all τ ∈ (]0, 1
2
])` and for
all (e, q) ∈ Eˆ×coQ , e+τ¤(ξ−e) remains in a compact set A of R`++. Hence,
the norm of the Hessian matrix of u is bounded above on A and we denote
by δ¯ an upper bound. Consequently, for all (e, q, τ) ∈ Eˆ × coQ× (]0, 1
2
])`,
∑`
h,k=1
αhαku
τ ′′
kh(ξ)ζhζk ≥ −δ¯
∑`
h=1
α2h(τ
h)2ζ2h ≥ −δ¯
∑`
h=1
αh(τ
h)2ζ2h.
The second inequality comes from the fact that 0 ≤ αh ≤ 1 for all h. We
remark that
ζh =
∑
k 6=h
√
ek exp(qk − qh)
√
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh).
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, one has
ζ2h ≤
(∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)
)(∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)2
)
.
Hence, one obtains the following lower bound for χ ·D2V τeα(q)(χ)∑`
h=1
αh
[
uτ ′eh(ξ)− δ¯(τh)2
(∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)
)](∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)2
)
Once again, from the definition of uτe , since e+ τ¤(ξ− e) remains in A, there
exists a lower bound δ > 0 such that for all h, for all x ∈ A, δ ≤ u′h(x).
Consequently, for all (e, q, τ) ∈ Eˆ × coQ× (]0, 1
2
])`, τhδ ≤ uτ ′eh(ξ).
Let δh = max
(e,q)∈Eˆ×coQ
∑
k′ 6=h
ek′ exp(qk′ − qh) and δ = max
h=1,...,`
{δh}. Then for all
(e, q, τ) ∈ Eˆ × coQ× (]0, 1
2
])`, we get:
χ ·D2V τeα(q)(χ) ≥
∑`
h=1
αhτ
h
[
δ − τhδ¯δ](∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)2
)
Let θ¯ < δ/δ¯δ. Hence for τ ∈ (]0; θ¯])`, for all (e, q) ∈ Eˆ×coQ, χ·D2V τeα(q)(χ) ≥
0 for all (e, q) ∈ Eˆ× coQ and χ ·D2V τeα(q)(χ) > 0 if χ 6= 0 and χ` = 0. Since
for all q ∈ coQ, q` = 0, one concludes that V τeα is strictly convex on coQ for
all (τ, e) ∈ (Γ ∩ (]0; θ¯])` × Eˆ. ¤
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Computation of formula (1)
Recall that α belongs to the simplex S, q to a compact subset coQ of R`+
and χ to R`. V τeα(q) and ϕj(q) are defined as follow:
V τeα(q) = (u
τ
e ◦ϕ)(q) = uτe (ϕ1(q), · · · , ϕ`(q)) ; ϕh(q) = αj
∑`
k=1
ek exp(qk−qh)
Let ξ = ϕ(q) =
(
αh
∑`
k=1
ek exp(qk − qh)
)`
h=1
. From the chain rule for the
derivatives, one has for all (χ, χ′) ∈ (R`)2,
χ′ ·D2V τeα(q)(χ) = D2uτe(ξ) (Dϕ(q)(χ);Dϕ(q)(χ′))+Duτe(ξ)
(
D2ϕ(q)(χ, χ′)
)
.
(2)
Note that
Dϕ(q)(χ) =
(
αh
∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)
)`
h=1
= α¤ζ (3)
and
D2ϕ(q)(χ, χ′) =
(
αh
∑
k 6=h
ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)(χ′k − χ′h)
)`
h=1
(4)
Consequently,
χ ·D2V τeα(q)(χ) = D2uτe(ξ) (α¤ζ;α¤ζ)+
Duτe(ξ)
(
αh
∑
k 6=h ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)2
)`
h=1
=
∑`
h,k=1 αhαku
τ ′′
ekh(ξ)ζhζk+∑`
h=1 αhu
τ ′
eh(ξ)
(∑
k 6=h ek exp(qk − qh)(χk − χh)2
)
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